An Incentive Compatible Multi-Armed-Bandit Crowdsourcing Mechanism with
  Quality Assurance by Jain, Shweta et al.
An Incentive Compatible Multi-Armed-Bandit
Crowdsourcing Mechanism with Quality
Assurance
Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Satyanath Bhat, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari
June 18, 2015
Abstract
Consider a requester who wishes to crowdsource a series of identical
binary labeling tasks to a pool of workers so as to achieve an assured accu-
racy for each task, in a cost optimal way. The workers are heterogeneous
with unknown but fixed qualities and their costs are private. The problem
is to select for each task an optimal subset of workers so that the outcome
obtained after aggregating the labels from the selected workers guaran-
tees a target accuracy level. The problem is a challenging one even in a
non strategic setting since the accuracy of aggregated label depends on
unknown qualities. We develop a novel multi-armed bandit (MAB) mech-
anism for solving this problem. First, we propose a framework, Assured
Accuracy Bandit (AAB), which leads to a MAB algorithm, Constrained
Confidence Bound for a Non Strategic setting (CCB-NS). We derive an
upper bound on the number of time steps the algorithm chooses a sub-
optimal set that depends on the target accuracy level and true qualities.
A more challenging situation arises when the requester not only has to
learn the qualities of the workers but also elicit their true costs. We mod-
ify the CCB-NS algorithm to obtain an adaptive exploration separated
algorithm which we call Constrained Confidence Bound for a Strategic
setting (CCB-S). CCB-S algorithm produces an ex-post monotone alloca-
tion rule and thus can be transformed into an ex-post incentive compatible
and ex-post individually rational mechanism that learns the qualities of
the workers and guarantees a given target accuracy level in a cost optimal
way. We also provide a lower bound on the number of times any algo-
rithm should select a sub-optimal set and we see that the lower bound
matches our upper bound upto a constant factor. We provide insights
on the practical implementation of this framework through an illustrative
example and we show the efficacy of our algorithms through simulations.
1 Introduction
Consider a company that provides financial advice to a collection of clients
on whether to invest in a particular security or not. In order to provide such
advice to each client, the company has a pool of financial consultants. Gathering
the opinion of as many consultants as possible and aggregating their opinions
(for example, using majority voting) increases the probability of providing a
high accuracy advice, however, it also entails increased costs. The company
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has two conflicting business requirements, firstly to keep the costs low, and
secondly, to provide an advice that meets a minimum threshold accuracy. The
individual financial consultants have unknown skill sets (qualities) and their
costs are typically private information. Since the consultants are strategic, they
might report higher costs for their services. On the other hand, to meet an
accuracy threshold, the company needs to learn the qualities of the consultants.
Assuming the qualities of the consultants do not change with time, their qualities
can be learnt by giving them homogeneous tasks.
As an abstraction to such problems, we consider a series of homogeneous
binary labeling tasks. There is a pool of agents and each agent has different
expertise or quality which is fixed but unknown. Since the tasks are homoge-
neous, the quality of an agent does not change from one task to another. In
addition, each agent incurs a cost to perform the task and the cost of an agent
is his private information and thus it can be strategically misreported. As a
design objective, it is required that the final outcome, obtained by aggregating
the answers from the selected agents, achieves a certain target accuracy. The
target accuracy level parameter provides a handle on the trade off between cost
and accuracy. A high value of the target accuracy level enhances the probability
of getting the right answer but at the same time may call for a larger number of
agents to be commissioned leading to raise in costs. Therefore, one can choose a
suitable target accuracy level as per task sensitivity at hand. In a nutshell, the
goal is to select a subset of the strategic agents with minimum cost to achieve
a desired accuracy level of the aggregated answer for each task, at the same
time giving the right incentives to the agents so that they report their costs
truthfully.
In the absence of strategic play or when the costs are known, the setting
reduces to a machine learning problem. Here, the requester has to select an
appropriate set of workers so as to minimize the costs while learning the quali-
ties. Though the requester can learn the qualities of the workers over a period
by observing their performance on similar tasks, selecting low quality workers
repeatedly may incur significant costs. Thus, the requester faces a dilemma of
exploration (where he has to learn the qualities of the workers) versus exploita-
tion (where he has to choose the workers optimally based on learnt qualities). A
natural solution to this problem can be be explored using techniques developed
for the multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem [28, 3]. In fact many existing works
considered learning qualities in non strategic crowdsourcing settings [35, 31].
However, an important challenge in our setting is the need to ensure the accu-
racy constraint which in turn depends on unknown qualities. Thus, there is a
need to develop a new framework to address the accuracy constraint.
An additional challenge arises when the costs of the workers are private and
the strategic workers try to manipulate the learning algorithm by misreporting
their costs so as to benefit themselves. In the strategic version of the above
problem, we have the additional task to elicit the true costs using a suitable
mechanism. If qualities were known, a natural way to ensure truthfulness is to
use a classic mechanism such as the VCG (Vickery-Clarke-Groves) mechanism
which satisfies many desirable game theoretic properties. However, since the
qualities are not known and need to be learnt, a VCG mechanism cannot be
applied directly [6]. Thus, we need to solve the problem of learning qualities
while eliciting the costs simultaneously. In short, we need to meld the techniques
from machine learning and game theory that would ensure honest behavior of
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the workers while the requester learns the qualities. Often such mechanisms
are referred to as Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms or simply MAB mechanisms
[6, 5, 16, 32]. The above MAB mechanisms, however, are not designed to achieve
a target accuracy level but to only learn the qualities. The MAB mechanism
proposed in this paper induces honest behavior, learns qualities and also achieves
required target accuracy.
1.1 Contributions
The above discussion highlights the need to design a new approach to solve
the problem of selecting a subset of the strategic workers to achieve a target
accuracy level in a cost optimal way. This paper solves such a problem for
the first time by modeling this problem in the multi-armed bandit mechanism
framework. We consider two versions of this problem: (1) a non strategic version
where the costs are known and the qualities of the workers have to be learnt
and (2) a strategic version where the costs are to be truthfully elicited as well.
In particular, the following are our contributions in this paper.
• We propose a novel framework, Assured Accuracy Bandit (AAB) where
we formulate an optimization problem.
• We provide a lower bound on the regret that any MAB algorithm in the
AAB framework has to suffer (Theorem 3.1).
We consider two versions of AAB.
Non Strategic Version
• In this setting, we design a novel algorithm, which we call, Non Strategic
Constraint Confidence Bound (CCB-NS).
• Though the true qualities are not known, our algorithm makes sure that
the accuracy constraint is satisfied with high probability (Theorem 4.1).
• We provide an upper bound on the number of times the algorithm selects
a suboptimal worker set for a given problem that depends on the target
accuracy level and the true qualities (Theorem 4.2). The upper bound
achieved by our algorithm matches the lower bound upto a constant factor.
Strategic Version
• In the strategic version of this problem where workers may not report
their costs truthfully, we modify the CCB-NS algorithm to an adaptive
exploration separated algorithm, which we call Strategic Constrained Con-
fidence Bound (CCB-S) and prove that the allocation rule provided by the
CCB-S is ex-post monotone (Theorem 5.2) in terms of the cost.
• Given this ex-post monotone allocation rule, we adopt the existing tech-
niques [5] to design an ex-post truthful and ex-post individually rational
mechanism (Corollary 5.3).
• For a particular optimization problem, we extend the CCB-S algorithm to
the non-exploration separated algorithm by exploiting the specific struc-
ture of the optimization problem. For this, we also show the efficacy of
our algorithms and compare the algorithms with a variant of εt−greedy
algorithm [3] through simulations.
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first mechanism that learns the
qualities of strategic agents (in this case crowd workers) who have costs as pri-
vate information where a certain target accuracy level is achieved for each task.
In general, MAB mechanisms are popular in the context of sponsored search
auctions which are forward auctions. We extend the work to a crowdsourcing
context which is a reverse auction setting.
1.1.1 Organization
The paper is organized as follows. We present a summary of the relevant work in
Section 2. In Section 3, we provide a general formulation of the problem. Next,
we present our model in two different stages. First, we discuss the non strategic
model in Section 4 and next in Section 5, we discuss the strategic version using
mechanism design. In Section 6, we provide an extension of the strategic version
to a more practical setting where we provide conditions when an approximate
solution of the optimization problem can be incorporated and workers can be
eliminated in the strategic setting, thus avoiding higher cost in exploration steps.
In this Section we also compare our algorithm with a variant of traditional
MAB algorithm, εt−greedy algorithm through simulations. Future work and
conclusions are provided in Section 7.
2 Related Work
First, we describe the state of the art addressing the non strategic versions of
problems in crowdsourcing such as learning the qualities of the workers to im-
prove the accuracy of the predicted answer. We then look into mechanism design
literature in crowdsourcing. Our setting involves both learning and mechanism
design. MAB mechanisms provide a natural solution in such setting. We also
review relevant MAB problems and MAB mechanism design literature.
Learning in Crowdsourcing
Ho et. al. [24] considered a similar setting where an assured quality needs to
be satisfied for each task. However, they dealt with a specific error probability
function with a uniform and known cost of the workers. We address the het-
erogeneous setting with costs being privately held by strategic workers and we
work with any general error probability function. Abraham et. al. [1] consider
a setting where a certain accuracy is required to be met for a given micro-task.
The authors considered the problem of aggregating answers in a sequential way
until a certain accuracy is achieved. Homogeneous workers are assumed in a
cluster and thus the goal is to select a single optimal crowd for a single task.
In a general setting, their assumption of a crowd having sufficient number of
homogeneous quality workers may not hold. Our setting is more general where
an optimal subset of workers (arms), with heterogeneous qualities, needs to be
selected at one go for a given micro-task. [19] consider a model where, workers
have different quality for each variety of task. In order to assign a task to the
worker, his quality on the previous similar tasks need to be estimated. However,
an assured accuracy model is not considered. Improving the quality of answers
while minimizing the cost is considered by Karger et al. [27] where the final
answer is predicted using a low rank approximation method. Work by Raykar et
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al. [31] considers learning a classifier while learning the qualities of the workers
using EM [15] algorithm. Viappiani et al. [36] consider a Bayesian approach
to learn the class label which take noisy observations from experts. Though,
the models proposed [36, 15, 31] work well experimentally, there are no analytic
guarantees on the predicted outcome. Tran-Thanh et al. [35] present an MAB
algorithm for efficient selection of capacitated workers where each worker can
perform only limited number of tasks. The authors formulated this as a knap-
sack problem. For each task, a single non strategic worker is selected as opposed
to the subset selection of strategic workers, whose costs need to be elicited.
Though the literature addresses how to learn the quality of workers, none of
the above papers addresses the challenge in meeting the target accuracy level on
each task in a heterogeneous cost model. We also consider the strategic version
where the costs can be misreported by the workers.
Mechanism Design in Crowdsourcing
A majority of the literature on mechanism design in crowdsourcing involves
design of pricing strategies with online workers. Babaioff et al. [4] use an
MAB mechanism to determine an optimal pricing mechanism for a crowdsourc-
ing problem having homogeneous qualities within a specified budget (known
as bandits with knapsack). Work by Singla and Krause [34] assumes costs to
be private information and proposes a posted price mechanism to elicit the
true costs from the users using MAB mechanisms while maintaining a bud-
get constraint. Mechanism design in online procurement auctions [4, 34, 7, 33]
considers homogeneous quality workers. Our setting is more general where an
auction mechanism is considered to elicit the true costs from the workers with
heterogeneous qualities.
Garg et al. [20] and Bhat et al. [9] consider the costs of the workers to
be public and the qualities to be private and strategic. Another line of work
involves incentivizing people to work with their true qualities, when the qualities
are privately held by the workers [37] in peer prediction markets. Cavallo and
Jain [11] analyze crowdsourcing tasks as winner take it all auctions in game
theoretic settings. They assume that only one worker gets paid and do not
try to learn the qualities over period. [23, 22] adopt techniques from online
mechanism design for eliciting the worker preferences but do not address the
task accuracy problem.
Mechanism design theory typically has been used in crowdsourcing either
to elicit the costs of the workers where qualities are homogeneous and known
or to elicit the qualities of the workers assuming the costs to be known. Our
work addresses the setting where the qualities of heterogeneous workers are to
be learnt and the heterogeneous costs are to be elicited.
MAB Algorithms
A rich body of literature is available on the MAB problem. Our problem be-
longs to the stochastic MAB setting, where the reward of each arm is fixed but
unknown. A recent survey by Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi [10] compiles several
variations on stochastic and non-stochastic MAB problems. The setting that is
closest to ours is considered by Shipra Agrawal and Nikhil Devanur [2] where a
general bandit problem with concave rewards and convex constraints is solved.
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Our problem setting is a further generalization, as the constraints in AAB are
not convex. Moreover, the constraint is satisfied in expectation in [2] as op-
posed to our work, where the constraint needs to be satisfied at each round.
The Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework is considered
in [18, 26, 38]. Our learning algorithm may appear closely related to the PAC
learning setting but it differs in a subtle but important way. The solution ob-
tained from any PAC algorithm is approximately correct with high probability
after arms are pulled for a certain number of rounds, which depends on the
provided approximation factor and the confidence. In our setting, the goal is to
select an optimal set with high probability since a constraint needs to be sat-
isfied with respect to stochastic qualities. Moreover, the number of exploration
steps are adaptive that depends on the true qualities and the target accuracy
level as opposed to the fixed number of exploration rounds in the PAC setting.
The combinatorial MAB problem introduced by Chen, Wang, and Yuan [13]
is relevant to our work. Pure exploration strategy in combinatorial framework
is considered in [12] where the objective is to identify an optimal subset from
given feasible subsets. However, in our setting collection of feasible sets is not
given and has to be learnt over the time and this makes our work different from
[13, 12] in the non strategic setting. A constrained MAB problem for single pull
is discussed by Ding et. al. [17], where each arm is associated with random
rewards and the goal of the algorithm is to maximize the reward such that total
cost which is also stochastic in all rounds does not exceed the budget but the
constraint is on overall rounds instead of each round.
MAB Mechanisms
Multi-armed Bandit mechanisms in the forward setting, in particular, as applied
to sponsored search auction are recent advancements that combine the area
of MAB problems and mechanism design. Any deterministic truthful MAB
mechanism must be exploration separated i.e. allocation in the learning phase
should not depend on the bids and thus the regret of any such algorithm is at
least O(T 2/3) where T is the total number of rounds [6, 16]. The results are also
extended to multiple pull multi-armed bandits i.e. to the case of multiple slot
sponsored search auction [21, 32]. The techniques developed in these papers
cannot be adopted to this setting because 1) the workers need to be paid in
spite of their failure as opposed to the setting where a payment is made only if
there is a success or a click 2) the setting is the constrained multi-armed bandit
setting as opposed to the setting of traditional multi-armed setting where a
best subset of arms is selected without constraints. Also note that, we are
considering a reverse auction setting as opposed to the forward auction in the
existing literature on MAB mechanisms. Babaioff et al. [5] design a general
procedure which takes any monotone allocation rule as input and converts it
into a randomized truthful mechanism which implements the input allocation
rule with high probability and requires evaluation of the input allocation rule
exactly once. As an application of this transformation, an MAB mechanism
that is ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individual rational with regret
of O(T 1/2) is proposed. In our current work, we use this transformation and
propose an ex-post monotone allocation rule in the case of a reverse auction in
a constrained multi-armed bandit setting. Mechanism proposed in [8] can be
translated in this setting to balance the trade-off between quality and the cost.
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However, the authors do not cater to the final accuracy of the task and selecting
a single worker was considered as oppose to our model.
Our preliminary results appeared in [25] where we considered only a cer-
tain type of error probability function to ensure the target accuracy level. This
current paper represent a significant improvement over our previous paper and
the techniques developed in this paper are applicable to a general class of error
probability functions satisfying monotonicity and bounded smoothness proper-
ties which we define later.
3 The Model
Let N be a set of n crowdsourcing workers available for working on T homo-
geneous crowdsourcing tasks. Each agent or worker i has an associated quality
qi ∈ [0.5, 1], which represents the probability that the answer given by him is
correct. By homogeneous or similar binary labeling tasks, we mean that each
worker’s quality is the same for all the tasks. We assume that the workers
are not spammers and their quality of service is at least 0.5. The quality of
any worker i is assumed to be independent of the qualities of other workers.
A worker i incurs a cost ci ∈ R which is privately held and can be reported
strategically by the workers. Let 1 − α be the target accuracy level (α is the
threshold level) provided by the requester that determines the trade-off between
the cost and the accuracy to be achieved for a particular task. We consider bi-
nary classification tasks where the labels are either zero or one. Our model is
summarized in Figure 1.
  
q1
q2
qn
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c2
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ŷ
ỹ1
ỹS
Learning
 Module
Aggregation 
Module
Agents
(Aggregated
 label)
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Labeler 
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ĉn
y
True Label
(Learned 
quality vector)
q̃
(Majority
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q̃
Figure 1: The model: qi, ci represent quality and true cost respectively of
a worker i, cˆi represents the reported cost by the worker i. The noisy label
obtained from the worker i is denoted by y˜i.
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Table 1: Notation Table
Notation Description
N Set of workers available
n Number of workers available
S Set of workers selected
St Subset of workers selected for task t
T Number of tasks
t Index for a task t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} (also referred as rounds)
α (1− α) is the target accuracy level required
µ Confidence level required to satisfy accuracy constraint
yt True label for task t
y˜ti Label reported by worker i for task t
y˜(St) Vector of labels y˜ti ∀i ∈ St
yˆt Label predicted for task t by aggregating all labels y˜ti ∀i ∈ St
ni(t) Number of times worker i is selected for tasks 1, 2, . . . , t
ki(t) Number of times worker i got the label right for tasks 1, 2, . . . , t
qi True quality of worker i
q Quality vector (q1, q2, . . . , qn)
qˆi(t) Estimated quality of worker i until tasks t
qˆ+i (t) Upper confidence bound (UCB) on qi until tasks t
qˆ−i (t) Lower confidence bound (LCB) on qi until tasks t
ci True cost of worker i for executing each task
cˆi Reported cost of worker i
c Cost vector (c1, c2, . . . , cn)
cˆ Reported cost vector (cˆ1, cˆ2, . . . , cˆn)
C(S)
∑
i∈S
ci
S∗ An optimal set of workers with respect to true qualities
fS(q) Error probability function of S with q
∆ Separation parameter of fS(q) from α for all set i.e. |α− fS(q)| > ∆ ∀S ⊆ N
h(.) Bounded smooth function s.t. max
i
|qi − q′i| ≤ δ =⇒ |fS(q)− fS(q′)| ≤ h(δ) ∀S ⊆ N
L Loss incurred when constraint is not satisfied
R Reward given when constraint is satisfied
Notations are summarized in Table 1. The error on a task with inputs from
the workers depends on the qualities of the workers and the rule to aggregate
these answers. We abstract this as error probability function which we describe
in the following subsection.
3.1 Error Probability Function
Let fS(q) be any function that represents the error probability (hence (1 −
fS(q)) captures the accuracy) when a set S is selected with quality profile q =
(q1, q2, . . . , qn). The problem we seek to solve in this paper involves minimizing
the cost, at the same time, satisfying the constraint that fS(q) < α where
(1−α) is the target accuracy level. Depending on the aggregation rule and the
requester requirements, different error probability functions could be defined.
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Our framework and the solution approach are general and work for any error
probability function that satisfies the following properties:
• Monotonicity: The error probability function fS(q) is said to be monotone
if for all quality profiles q and q′ such that if ∀i ∈ N , q′i ≤ qi, we have,
fS(q
′) < α =⇒ fS(q) < α, ∀S ⊆ N , ∀α ∈ [0, 1] .
That is, an increase in quality of each worker can only increase the accu-
racy or decrease the error probability.
• Bounded smoothness: The error probability function fS(q) satisfies bounded
smoothness if there exists a strictly increasing, continuous (hence, invert-
ible) function h such that if
max
i
|qi − q′i| ≤ δ =⇒ |fS(q)− fS(q′)| ≤ h(δ), ∀S ⊆ N ,∀q, q′ ∈ [0.5, 1] .
That is, when the two quality profiles are close, the difference in error
probability function with respect to these quality profiles is bounded by a
monotone continuous function h.
These properties are similar to the properties satisfied by the reward func-
tion in [13] and are satisfied by various error probability functions. Next, we
give certain examples of error probability functions that satisfy the properties
of monotonicity and bounded smoothness when majority voting is used as an
aggregation rule. Note that, the algorithm is general enough to incorporate any
aggregation rule and any error probability function if monotonicity and bounded
smoothness properties are satisfied.
3.1.1 Examples of error probability functions
Let S be the selected set with players {1, 2, . . . , s} with the quality profile q,
such that q1 ≤ q2 ≤ . . . ≤ qs to whom we assign a certain task t. For notation
convenience, we drop t and let y˜i ∈ {−1, 1} be the reported label that we get
from the worker i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s} and y˜(S) = (y˜1, y˜2, . . . , y˜s) be the vector of
reported labels from the workers set S. Then, the predicted label yˆ when a
majority voting rule is used as an aggregation rule is given by:
yˆ =
1 if
∑
i∈S
y˜i > 0,
0 otherwise.
(1)
Example 3.1 The probability of the most likely outcome that leads to an error
is given by [25]:
P(ES(q)) = max
y˜(S)∈{−1,1}S
P(y˜(S), yˆ 6= y|y)
= max
y˜(S)∈{−1,1}S
(P(yˆ 6= y|y, y˜(S))P(y˜(S)|y))
= (1− q1)(1− q2) . . . (1− qs′)qs′+1 . . . qs,
where s′ = b((s+ 1)/2)c.
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Note that once y, y˜(S) is fixed, yˆ 6= y is either true or false and hence P(yˆ 6=
y|y, y˜(S))=0 or 1. P(y˜(S)|y)) is maximum when the top half quality workers
make mistakes in which case, yˆ 6= y. Instead of satisfying the constraints with
respect to P(ES(q)), one can satisfy the constraint with respect to the quantity
Pˆ(ES(q)) which is given as:
fS(q) = Pˆ(ES(q)) = (1− q1)(1− q2) . . . (1− qs′) . (2)
Note that fS(q) satisfies monotonicity as well as the bounded smoothness prop-
erty.
Example 3.2 The average probability of error is given by [29]:
P(ES(q)) = P(y = 1)P(yˆ = −1|y = 1) + P(y = −1)P(yˆ = 1|y = −1)
= piP
(
s∑
i=1
y˜i ≤ 0|y = 1
)
+ (1− pi)P
(
s∑
i=1
y˜i > 0|y = −1
)
,
where pi is the probability that true label y is 1. Let us now focus on P
(
s∑
i=1
y˜i ≤ 0|y = 1
)
.
E[y˜i|y = 1] = −P(y˜i = −1|y = 1) + P(y˜i = 1|y = 1) = (2qi − 1) .
Now,
P
(
s∑
i=1
y˜i ≤ 0|y = 1
)
= P
(
s∑
i=1
y˜i − E
[
s∑
i=1
y˜i|y = 1
]
≤ −E
[
s∑
i=1
y˜i|y = 1
]
|y = 1
)
= P
(
s∑
i=1
y˜i − E
[
s∑
i=1
y˜i
]
≤ −
s∑
i=1
(2qi − 1)
)
≤ exp

−
(
s∑
i=1
(2qi − 1)
)2
2
∑s
i=1 1
 (By Hoeffding’s inequality).
Similarly, it can be shown that:
P
(
s∑
i=1
y˜i > 0|y = −1
)
≤ exp

−
(
s∑
i=1
(2qi − 1)
)2
2
∑s
i=1 1
 .
Assuming pi = 1− pi = 0.5, we get,
P(ES(q)) ≤ fS(q) = exp

−
(
s∑
i=1
(2qi − 1)
)2
2
∑s
i=1 1
 .
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Again, one can verify that function fS(q) is monotone and satisfies bounded
smoothness property. If the quality of every worker i satisfies 12 +  ≤ qi ≤ 1,
then, (2qi − 1) ≥ 2 and the above expression can be simplified as:
P(ES(q)) ≤ exp

−
(
s∑
i=1
(2qi − 1)
)2
2
∑s
i=1 1
 ≤ exp
(
−
s∑
i=1
(2qi − 1)
)
= fS(q).
From the above examples we see that it is reasonable to assume monotonicity
and bounded smoothness for fS(q).
Now, we describe our framework in which the optimization problem takes
the center stage.
3.2 Assured Accuracy Bandit (AAB) Framework
Recall that a task t ∈ {1, . . . , T} needs to be completed with an assured accuracy
provided by the requester with the optimal cost in a sequential fashion. Thus,
for each task t, the goal of the requester is to select a set of workers St, such
that the error probability function is less then the threshold level. At the same
time, the requester has to make sure that the tasks are completed optimally in
terms of costs. Hence for each task t, we need to solve the following optimization
problem.
min
Xti∈{0,1}
∑
i
ciX
t
i ,
s.t.,
f{i:Xti=1}(q) < α.
(3)
where the qualities of the workers are not known a priori and hence need to be
learnt by giving tasks repeatedly to the workers. Also, solving the optimization
problem, the requester has to make sure that the constraint in (3) is satisfied
with respect to the true qualities with high confidence. We refer to this novel
framework as Assured Accuracy Bandits (AAB).
3.2.1 Regret in AAB Framework
The performance of any MAB algorithm is typically measured by the regret it
achieves. Regret in an MAB framework is defined to be the reward difference
between the learning algorithm and the optimal algorithm. We will see later
that our algorithm is designed in such a way that for each task t, the constraint
given by (3) is satisfied with probability (1 − µ), where µ is the confidence
parameter with which constraint is satisfied. Thus we can define the regret of
an algorithm A if the constraint is satisfied as:
R(A) =
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈St
ci − T
∑
i∈S∗
ci, (4)
St is the set selected by the algorithm A for task t,
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S∗ is the optimal set with known qualities.
Since the constraint for each task is satisfied with probability (1 − µ), we can
also bound the total expected regret by:
E[R(A)] = (1− µ)
(
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈St
ci − T
∑
i∈S∗
ci
)
+ µLT , (5)
where L is the cost that is incurred by the requester if the constraint fails
to satisfy. We are considering a setting where value of L is large, and the
requester would not want to violate the constraint. However, due to stochasticity
involved in learning the qualities, there is a small probability (µ) with which
the constraint can be violated. With µ = 1/T , we get the regret expression as:
E[R(A)] = (1− 1
T
)
(
T∑
t=1
∑
i∈St
ci − T
∑
i∈S∗
ci
)
+ L .
3.3 Lower Bound on the Regret
We first start with an important property called as ∆−separated property that
we assume any quality profile q satisfies. The property is given as follows:
Definition 3.1 (∆-Separated Property:) We say that q is ∆-Separated with
respect to the threshold α if ∃∆ > 0 such that, ∆ = infS⊆N |fS(q) − α|. That
is, no set of workers, S, has probability of error fS(q) ∈ [α−∆, α+ ∆].
Given a quality profile q that satisfies ∆−separated property, we now provide
a lower bound on the regret that any algorithm in AAB framework has to suffer.
Theorem 3.1 Let nS(A) denotes the number of times a worker set S is selected
till time T by any algorithm A. Consider any algorithm that solves the opti-
mization problem given by Equation (3) and satisfies E[nS(A)] = o(T a) ∀a > 0
for any subset of worker S which is not optimal. Then, the following holds:
lim inf
T→∞
E[R(A)] ≥ lnT
(h−1(∆))2
,
where, ∆ = infS⊆N |fS(q)− α| and h(.) is the bounded smooth function.
Proof:
The proof follows similar steps given in [10] for the lower bound proof of classical
MAB problem for Bernoulli reward. For p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1], denote kl(p1, p2) the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between a Bernoulli of parameter p1 and a Bernoulli
of parameter p2 defined as:
kl(p1, p2) = p1 ln
(p1
p2
)
+ (1− p1) ln
(1− p1
1− p2
)
.
It is easy to see that the function x 7→ kl(p1, x) is a continuous function.
• Consider two workers with quality profile, q = (q1, q2) with f{1}(q) <
α < f{2}(q) and c1 > c2. Since, kl divergence is a continuous function
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and error probability function f is monotone, for any  > 0, one can
find quality profile q′ = (q1, q′2) such that f{1}(q
′) < f{2}(q′) < α and
kl(q2, q
′
2) ≤ (1 + )kl(q2, 1 − α). Thus, worker 1 is optimal with quality
profile q but worker 2 optimal with quality profile q′. Denote P,E as the
probability, expectation taken with respect to random variables generated
with quality profile q and P′,E′ as the probability, expectation taken with
respect to random variables generated with quality profile q′.
• Denote X2,1, X2,2, . . . , X2,T as the sequence of successes obtained when
allocating tasks to worker 2 where successes are coming from quality profile
q. For any t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, let
kˆlt =
t∑
i=1
ln
q2X2,i + (1− q2)(1−X2,i)
q′2X2,i + (1− q′2)(1−X2,i)
.
Note that, E[kˆln2(A)] = n2(A)kl(q2, q′2). We also have the following
change of measure identity for any event B in the σ−algebra generated
by X2,1, X2,2, . . . X2,T :
P′(B) = E[IB exp(−kˆln2(A))]. (6)
• Now, consider the event CT = {n2(A) < 1−kl(q2,q′2) ln(T ) and kˆln2(A) ≤
(1− 2 ) ln(T )}. We will prove that P(CT )→ 0 as T →∞. From Equation
(6):
P′(CT ) = E[ICT exp(−kˆln2(A))] ≥ e−(1−/2) ln(T )P(CT ).
Let fT =
1−
kl(q2,q′2)
ln(T ). Then using Markov’s inequality we have,
P(CT ) ≤ T (1−/2)P′(CT ) ≤ T (1−/2)P′(n2(A) < fT ) ≤ T (1−/2)E
′(T − n2(A))
T − fT .
Since there are only two workers here, T − n2(A) = n1(A). With respect
to quality profile q′ since worker 1 is sub-optimal, we have:
P(CT ) ≤ T (1−/2) T
a
T − fT , ∀a > 0.
Consider a < /2 then we get P(CT )→ 0 as T →∞.
• Now, we will prove that P(n2(A) < fT )→ 0 as T →∞. We have,
P(CT ) ≥ P
(
n2(A) < fT and max
t≤fT
kˆlt ≤
(
1− 
2
)
ln(T )
)
= P
(
n2(A) < fT and kl(q2, q
′
2)
(1− ) ln(T ) maxt≤fT kˆlt ≤
1− /2
1−  kl(q2, q
′
2)
)
.
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Using the maximal version of the strong law of large numbers and since
kl(q2, q
′
2) > 0 and
1−/2
1− > 1, we get:
lim
T→∞
P
(
kl(q2, q
′
2)
(1− ) ln(T ) maxt≤fT kˆlt ≤
1− /2
(1− ) kl(q2, q
′
2)
)
= 1.
Thus, from the previous point we get P(n2(A) < fT ) → 0 as T → ∞.
Thus, we get,
E[n2(A)] > 1− 
1 + 
ln(T )
kl(q2, 1− α) .
Using the fact that kl(p1, p2) ≤ (p1−p2)
2
p2(1−p2) and worker 2 is suboptimal with
quality profile q we get:
E[R(A)] >
(
1− 
1 + 
)
ln(T )
kl(q2, 1− α) (c2 − c1) ≥
(
1− 
1 + 
)
α(1− α) ln(T )
(q2 − (1− α))2 (c2 − c1).
• Since, (1−α) is the target accuracy, fS(1−α) = α, for any subset S. From
the bounded smoothness property, |f{2}(q) − f{2}(1 − α)| ≤ h(q2 − (1 −
α)) =⇒ (q2−(1−α))2 ≥ (h−1(|f{2}(q)−α|))2. If we choose q1 and q2 such
that ∆ = |f{2}(q)−α| then we get E[R](A)] >
(
1−
1+
)
α(1−α) ln(T )
(h−1(∆))2 (c2−c1),
yielding the lower bound.

The above theorem proves that, in order to reach to the optimal solution in
AAB framework, it is required to pull a sub-optimal arm atleast O
(
ln(T )
(h−1(∆))2
)
number of times. Here, ∆ depends on the problem instance.
3.4 Related MAB Algorithms
There are various MAB algorithms for different related settings. Here we list
the two algorithms closest to our setting.
3.4.1 The UCB Algorithm
The UCB algorithm proposed by Auer et al. [3] works for the classical MAB
problem where only one arm is pulled at any given time. This algorithm main-
tains an upper confidence bound (hence the name UCB) on each arm which
depends on its empirical reward as well as on the exploration factor to give the
arm enough number of pulls. The algorithm achieves a regret of O(lnT ) and it
is the best possible regret that can be achieved. One extension to the multiple
pull setting is to pull the arms in the increasing order of their upper confidence
bound.
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3.4.2 The CUCB Algorithm
The CUCB algorithm [13] generalizes UCB to the combinatorial setting. At
each time, a subset of arms is pulled and the rewards of all the selected arms
are revealed. The algorithm works for general non-linear reward functions as
long as monotonicity and bounded smoothness properties are satisfied by the
reward functions. The general idea of the algorithm is to select the subset such
that the reward is maximized with respect to the upper confidence bounds of
all the arms similar to the UCB algorithm where a single arm is selected with
the highest upper confidence bound. The CUCB algorithm achieves a regret of
O(lnT ). The AAB framework handles an unknown stochastic constraint given
by fS(q) < α in contrast to the CUCB algorithm where the reward function is
stochastic with known constraints.
We now provide some realistic assumptions that we have made in our model
to design algorithms for AAB framework.
3.5 Assumptions
• We consider a series of binary classification tasks as an abstraction to our
problem.
• We assume that the error probability function satisfies the assumptions
of monotonicity and bounded smoothness. These assumptions are natural
and are satisfied by many interesting error probability functions.
• We assume that the true label is observed once the task is completed.
To motivate this assumption, we recall the trading example given in the
introduction section where the company and the clients can realize the
true label by the end of the day, for example, in an intraday trading.
• We assume that if all the workers are selected, then the constraint is
always satisfied with respect to the true qualities. Thus, if qualities are
only partially learnt, then the algorithm can select the complete set and
satisfy the constraint. This is equivalent to saying that there are enough
good workers.
4 Non Strategic Version
In this setting, our goal is to learn the qualities of the workers while assuming
costs to be publicly known. We solve a general optimization problem given by
Equation (3) with unknown qualities which are to be learnt over a period of
time. Since the workers obtain their labels according to the true qualities, the
constraint has to be satisfied with respect to the true qualities. Since these
qualities are unknown to the requester, he has to make sure that the constraint
is satisfied with high probability. Note that our algorithm works in a general
setting with any aggregation rule and with any error probability function that
satisfies the monotonicity and the bounded smoothness properties. Thus, the
algorithm uses the aggregation rule as a black box.
Definition 4.1 (Aggregate) An aggregate function takes the noisy labels of
the selected set as input and produces a label yˆ which best captures the opinion
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of labeler set. We call this label as the aggregated label. The aggregate function
should ensure that the resulting error probability function satisfies the properties
of monotonicity and bounded smoothness. For example, if the majority voting
rule is used, the aggregated label yˆ is computed using the equation (1).
We now present the non strategic version of the Constrained Confidence
Bound algorithm (CCB-NS) that satisfies the constraint for each task with high
probability.
4.1 CCB-NS Algorithm
The CCB-NS algorithm (presented in Algorithm 1) works on the principle of
the UCB algorithm [3] and ensures that the constraint in (3) is satisfied with
high confidence µ. Input to the algorithm is parameter α, the target accuracy
(which is assumed to be same for all the tasks), the number of tasks T , the
number of workers n, and confidence level µ with which the constraint in (3) is
required to be satisfied. The output of the algorithm will be the subset St and
predicted label yˆt for each task t. The predicted label yˆt is decided based on an
aggregation function (AGGREGATE) defined in 4.1 with noisy labels collected
from the worker set St as input.
Initially all the workers are selected to have some estimate about the qual-
ities (Step 2). Their reported labels are aggregated and a label is predicted.
Next, the algorithm observes the true label and updates the mean quality esti-
mates, the upper and lower confidence bounds. Let ni(t) denote the number of
times the ith worker is assigned the task and ki(t) denote the number of times
the worker has provided the correct label up to the task t. Similar to the UCB
algorithm [3], the algorithm maintains upper confidence and lower confidence
bounds on qualities. These bounds are given as follows:
qˆ+i (t) = qˆi(t)+
√
1
2ni(t)
ln
(
2n
µ
)
, qˆ−i (t) = qˆi(t)−
√
1
2ni(t)
ln
(
2n
µ
)
, where qˆi(t) =
ki(t)
ni(t)
.
By Hoeffding’s inequality, one can prove that the true quality qi lies between
qˆ−i (t) and qˆ
+
i (t) with probability 1− µn for any task t and for any worker i. The
bounds used by UCB1 algorithm given in [3] is given by:
qˆ+i (t) = qˆi(t) +
√
2 ln t
ni(t)
, qˆ−i (t) = qˆi(t)−
√
2 ln t
ni(t)
.
Since, we want to extend the algorithm to the strategic setting, we are using a
constant term 2nµ in the bounds instead of t. We initialize qˆ
+
i (t) and qˆ
−
i (t) by 1
and 0.5 respectively as the true qualities of the workers lie between [0.5, 1]. In
the algorithm, we represent qˆi, qˆ
+
i and qˆ
−
i to be the estimates till t number of
tasks. The key idea in our algorithm is, till we have identified the optimal subset
of workers, we solve the optimization problem using the upper confidence bound
on the qualities which gives a cost effective subset. However, this subset need not
meet the desired accuracy. Hence we add another subset of the workers from
the remaining workers (using subroutine MINIMAL) that combined together
ensures that the target accuracy is met even when we use the lower estimates,
that is qˆ− in the constraints. The fact that qi ≥ qˆ−i with probability at least
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ALGORITHM 1: CCB-NS Algorithm
Input: Set of workers N , number of tasks T , parameter α, confidence
level µ
Output: Labeler selection set St, Label yˆt for all tasks t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}
1 ∀i ∈ N , qˆ+i = 1, qˆ−i = 0.5, ki(1) = 0 // Initialize UCB and LCB on
qualities
2 S1 = N // Select all workers initially
3 Observe y˜(S1) and yˆ1 = AGGREGATE(y˜(S1)) (Definition 4.1)
4 Observe true label y1
5 ∀i ∈ N , ni(1) = 1, ki(1) = 1 if y˜1i = y1 and qˆi = ki(1)/ni(1)
6 t = 2
7 St = arg min
S⊆N
∑
i∈S
ci s.t. fS(qˆ
+) < α
8 while fSt(qˆ
−) > α do
9 // Explore (not the optimal set, add more workers to satisfy the
constraint)
10 St = St ∪MINIMAL(St,N \ St, qˆ−)
11 Observe labels of selected labelers y˜(St)
12 yˆt = AGGREGATE(y˜(St))
13 Observe true label yt
14 for i ∈ St do
15 ni(t) = ni(t− 1) + 1
16 if y˜ti = y
t then
17 ki(t) = ki(t− 1) + 1
18 qˆi = ki(t)/ni(t), qˆ
+
i = qˆi +
√
1
2ni(t)
ln( 2nµ ),
qˆ−i = qˆi −
√
1
2ni(t)
ln( 2nµ )
19 t = t+ 1
20 St = arg min
S⊆N
∑
i∈S
ci s.t. fS(qˆ
+) < α
21 t∗ = t
22 St
∗
= St
23 for t = t∗ + 1 to T do
24 // Exploit (optimal set with high probability)
25 St = St
∗
26 Observe labels of selected labelers y˜(St)
27 yˆt = AGGREGATE(y˜(St))
28 Subroutine: MINIMAL(St, S, q)
29 Return a minimal set S′ ⊆ S of workers such that fSt∪S′(q) < α
30 If no such set S′ exists then return S
1− µn and the monotonicity of the error function ensures that the target accuracy
level is achieved in each round with high probability. Once the algorithm finds
a subset that is optimal with respect to the upper confidence on qualities and
achieves the target accuracy even when using the lower confidence on qualities,
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the algorithm stops learning and uses this set for the remaining tasks. We prove
(Lemma 4.1) that this is the required optimal set with high probability. Note
that, in Step 10 if the MINIMAL function cannot find a set satisfying the target
accuracy level using the lower confidence bound, then it simply returns N which
meets the target accuracy level by our assumption.
We first see that the algorithm CCB-NS satisfies the constraint at each round
with high probability. Note that by Hoeffding’s inequality, for each i, qˆ−i ≤ qi ≤
qˆ+i with probability 1 − µn . Since the workers make error independently, we
have, ∀i ∈ N qˆ−i ≤ qi ≤ qˆ+i with probability
(
1− µn
)n ≥ (1− µ) by Bernoulli’s
inequality. Thus, ∀i ∈ N qˆ−i ≤ qi ≤ qˆ+i with probability greater then 1 − µ.
For brevity of notation, in the rest of the paper we will use qˆ− ≤ q ≤ qˆ+ to
represent qˆ−i ≤ qi ≤ qˆ+i ∀i ∈ N .
From this, we make an important observation, as with probability at least,
1− µ, qˆ− ≤ q ≤ qˆ+ and monotonicity of f(.),
w.p. at least 1− µ, fS(qˆ+) < fS(q) < fS(qˆ−) ∀S ⊆ N (7)
Theorem 4.1 The CCB-NS algorithm satisfies the constraint in Equation (3)
with probability at least 1-µ at every round t.
Proof:
• By our assumption that if all the workers are selected, the constraint is
always satisfied, thus, in the rounds in which all the workers are selected,
the constraint is satisfied.
• Now, if set St is returned by CCB-NS, then,
fSt(qˆ
−) < α =⇒ fSt(q) < α with probability 1− µ (From Equation 7).

We now show that if the algorithm exits the while loop in Step 21 then the
set St
∗
= S∗ (the optimal set) with probability at least 1 − µ. For simplicity,
in the rest of the paper, we assume that there exists a unique optimal set S∗,
though the results can be easily generalized to the case where there are multiple
optimal sets.
Lemma 4.1 Set St
∗
returned by the CCB-NS algorithm is an optimal set with
probability (w.p.) at least 1− µ. That is, C(St∗) = C(S∗) w.p. 1− µ.
Proof: Let t∗ be the round in which CCB-NS stops exploring. At t = t∗,
• Since fS∗(q) < α, we have, fS∗(qˆ+) < α with probability 1 − µ (From
Equation (7)).
• Let St
∗
be the set of workers selected by CCB-NS. As CCB-NS solves the
optimization problem 3,
C(St
∗
) ≤ C(S∗) .
At t∗,
fSt∗ (qˆ
−) < α⇒ fSt∗ (q) ≤ fSt∗ (qˆ−) < α with probability at least 1− µ,
⇒ C(St∗) = C(S∗) .

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4.2 Regret Analysis of CCB-NS
In this section, we aim to bound the number of non-optimal rounds for the
CCB-NS algorithm presented in Algorithm 1.
Definition 4.2 (Non-optimal Subset) We say that at round t, a set St se-
lected by the algorithm is a non-optimal subset, if St 6= S∗.
Definition 4.3 (Non-optimal Round:) We say a round t is a non-optimal
round if the selected set St is not the optimal set S∗.
We bound the number of exploration steps. Since the algorithm selects a set
which satisfies the constraint for each task with high probability, we can bound
the overall regret by bounding the number of rounds in which the algorithm
selects a sub-optimal set St i.e. C(St) > C(S∗). If C(St) = C(S∗), then
we get zero regret for those rounds with probability (1 − µ). We will show
that the number of non-optimal rounds depends on the value of ∆ where ∆ =
infS⊆N |fS(q) − α|. The value of ∆ is typically unknown to the requester
since qualities are unknown but our algorithm does not require the value of ∆
beforehand and thus, CCB-NS is adaptive in nature.
Lemma 4.2 If ∀i ∈ N , number of times a worker i is selected till tasks t,
ni(t) ≥ 2(h−1(∆))2 ln( 2nµ ), then for any task t,
1. ∀S ⊆ N , S 6= S∗, fS(q) > α =⇒ fS(qˆ+) > α with probability 1− µ.
2. fS∗(qˆ
−) < α with probability 1− µ.
Proof: Let l = 2(h−1(∆))2 ln(
2n
µ ).
• By Hoeffding’s inequality, qˆ+i −qi ≤ 2
√
1
2ni(t)
ln( 2nµ ) ≤ 2
√
1
2l ln(
2n
µ ) ∀ni(t) ≥
l, with probability 1− µn .
• Substituting l = 2(h−1(∆))2 ln(
2n
µ ), qˆ
+
i −qi ≤ h−1(∆) with probability 1− µn .
Thus, qˆ+ − q ≤ h−1(∆) with probability 1− µ.
• By bounded smoothness and monotonicity, fS(q)−fS(qˆ+) ≤ h(h−1(∆)) ≤
∆ with probability 1− µ.
• Similarly, ∀S ⊆ N , fS(qˆ−)− fS(q) ≤ ∆ with probability 1− µ.
Thus, fS(qˆ
+) ≥ fS(q)−∆ and fS∗(qˆ−) ≤ fS∗(q) + ∆.
Thus, fS(q) > α⇒ fS(qˆ+) > α (∵ fS(q) > α+ ∆,∆-separated property).
And, fS∗(qˆ
−) < α (∵ fS∗(q) < α−∆,∆-separated property).

Lemma 4.3 If a non-optimal set St is selected for the task t then there exists
a worker i ∈ St such that ni(t) ≤ 2(h−1(∆))2 ln( 2nµ ) with probability 1− µ.
Proof: A non-optimal subset St could be selected in two ways:
• fSt(qˆ+) < α but fSt(q) > α,
• fS∗(qˆ−) > α.
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From Lemma 4.2, if ni(t) ≥ 2(h−1(∆))2 ln( 2nµ ) ∀i ∈ St, then, both the conditions
are violated and thus a non-optimal subset is not selected.

Theorem 4.2 The number of non-optimal rounds by the CCB-NS algorithm is
bounded by 2n(h−1(∆))2 ln(
2n
µ ) with probability 1− µ.
Proof:
• Lemma 4.1 shows that the CCB-NS exploitation rounds are optimal rounds.
• A new parameter ui(t) is associated with each worker. Whenever a set St
is selected then, ui(t) = ui(t) + 1 s.t i ∈ St and i = arg min
j∈St
uj(t).
• Every time a non-optimal subset St is selected, ui(t) of only one worker
is updated with the lowest value of ui(t) so far, such that i ∈ St. Thus,
ui(t) ≤ ni(t) ∀i ∈ N ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}.
• Thus, from Lemma 4.3, the number of exploration rounds is bounded by
2n
(h−1(∆))2 ln(
2n
µ ) with probability 1− µ.
Hence the theorem follows.

Corollary 4.3 The total expected regret is bounded by(
1− 1
T
)
2n
(h−1(∆))2
ln(2nT )C(N ) + L,
where L is the loss incurred by the requester if the constraint is not satisfied.
The above corollary can be obtained by substituting µ = 1/T . We see that
the regret by CCB-NS algorithm matches the lower bound in AAB framework
up to a constant factor. In this section, we assumed that the costs are known.
However, in real world situations, we need to elicit them truthfully from the
strategic workers which we address next.
5 Strategic Version
Without proper incentives, the strategic agents may not report their costs truth-
fully. In this section, we propose an algorithm which we call, CCB-S that
satisfies a certain monotonicity property and then present a mechanism design
implementation. We will first describe the game theoretic version of the problem
addressed in the previous section.
5.1 The Model
Denote the true cost of a worker i by ci and the reported cost by cˆi. The
valuation of a worker i is given by vi = −ci. We denote the requester as agent
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0 and the valuation of the requester, when the task is allocated to the worker
set S, by:
v0(S) =
{
R if fS(q) < α,
−L otherwise.
Here, fS(q) is the error probability function that satisfies monotonicity and
bounded smoothness properties. We denote 1− α as the target accuracy level.
The parameter R denotes the reward that the requester gets for satisfying the
constraint and L denotes the loss he incurs if the constraint in Equation (3) is
not satisfied. Note that the requester is not considered to be strategic. Social
welfare W (S) is given by:
W (S) =

R−
∑
i∈S
ci if fS(q) < α,
−L−
∑
i∈S
ci otherwise.
A mechanismM is denoted by the pair (A,P), where A = (A1,A2, . . . ,An)
is the allocation vector where Ai represents number of tasks allocated to worker
i and P = (P1,P2, . . . ,Pn) is the payment vector where Pi denotes the total
payment made to the worker i which depends on the reported cost profile cˆ. We
work in a quasi-linear setting where the utility of every agent is given by:
ui(ci, cˆ; q) = −ci.Ai(cˆ; q) + Pi(cˆ; q) .
We consider the problem where a heavy penalty is incurred for providing the
wrong answer and thus, the parameter L is large. We now review some of the
desirable properties that the mechanism M should satisfy:
Definition 5.1 (Incentive Compatible) A mechanism M = (A,P) is said
to be Incentive Compatible if reporting true valuations is a dominant strategy
for all the workers. That is, ∀i ∈ N ,
− ciAi(ci, cˆ−i; q) + Pi(ci, cˆ−i; q) ≥ −ciAi(cˆi, cˆ−i; q) + Pi(cˆi, cˆ−i; q) ∀cˆi ∈ [0, 1] and cˆ−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1 .
Definition 5.2 (Individual Rationality) A mechanism M = (A,P) is said
to be individually rational for a worker if participating in the mechanism always
gives him positive utility. That is, ∀i ∈ N ,
−cˆiAi(cˆi, c−i; q) + Pi(cˆi, c−i; q) ≥ 0 ∀cˆi ∈ [0, 1] and ∀c−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1 .
An important characterization for incentive compatible mechanisms pro-
vided by Myerson [30] states that for a mechanism to be truthful, the allocation
rule should be monotone in terms of reported bids by the players. Babaioff
et. al. [5] provide a generic transformation that takes any monotone allocation
rule and outputs a mechanism which is incentive compatible and individually
rational. We can use this generic transformation to design the mechanism in
our setting. We first provide the definition of monotonicity in our setting.
Definition 5.3 (Monotonicity of Allocation Rule) An allocation rule A is
monotone if for every worker i, and for every fixed cˆ−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1,
cˆi ≤ cˆ′i ⇒ Ai(cˆi, cˆ−i; q) ≥ Ai(cˆ′i, cˆ−i; q),
where Ai(cˆi, cˆ−i; q) is the number of tasks given to the ith worker with bids cˆi
and cˆ−i.
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Since there is randomness involved due to learnt qualities, let us first define
every possible random seed. The random variables are the labels provided by
the workers and can affect the learnt qualities and thus the allocation rule.
Definition 5.4 (Success Realization) A success realization is a matrix ρ ∈
{0, 1,−1}n×T such that,
ρit =

1 if y˜ti = y
t,
0 if y˜ti 6= yt,
−1 if worker i is not selected for the tthtask.
We also define relevant weaker notions of incentive compatibility, individual
rationality and monotonicity. Note that, the allocation and payment rule will
depend on success realizations when the true qualities are not known.
Definition 5.5 (Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility) We say that a mech-
anism is ex-post incentive compatible if all the bidders are truthful for every
success realization irrespective of the bids of other workers, i.e., ∀i ∈ N , ∀ρ ∈
{0, 1,−1}n×T
− ciAi(ci, cˆ−i, ρ) + Pi(ci, cˆ−i, ρ) ≥ −ciAi(cˆi, cˆ−i, ρ) + Pi(cˆi, cˆ−i, ρ), ∀cˆi ∈ [0, 1], cˆ−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1 .
Definition 5.6 (Ex-Post Individual Rationality) We say that a mechanism
is ex-post individual rational if for every success realization, truth telling does
not give negative utility to any player corresponding to any bids of other players,
−cˆiAi(cˆi, c−i, ρ) + Pi(cˆi, c−i, ρ) ≥ 0 ∀cˆi ∈ [0, 1], c−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1, ρ ∈ {0, 1,−1}n×T .
Definition 5.7 (Ex-Post Monotone Allocation Rule) If the allocation rule
is monotone with respect to every success realization then we say that it is ex-post
monotone.
Ati(cˆi, c−i; ρ) ≤ Ati(ci, c−i; ρ), ∀i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, ∀cˆi ≥ ci, ∀ρ . (8)
Based on the above preliminaries for truthful implementation of a MAB
algorithm, we now present the strategic version of CCB-NS algorithm which we
call the CCB-S algorithm.
5.2 The CCB-S Algorithm
As we have seen in the previous section, we need monotonicity of an allocation
rule for incentive compatibility. In CCB-NS, if the selected set St in Step 8
does not satisfy the constraint with qˆ−, in Step 10, we add agents to satisfy
the constraint. This step does not consider strategic costs and thus leads to a
violation of monotonicity. Hence, we design a new algorithm which achieves the
necessary monotonicity.
In order to ensure truthfulness, we modify the CCB-NS algorithm to select all
the workers if the constraint is not satisfied with respect to the lower confidence
bound (Step 10). We present CCB-S in Algorithm 2. We then show that
the allocation rule given by the algorithm is ex-post monotone. Thus, we can
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apply results from [5] to achieve an ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post
individual rational mechanism. Before going to the formal analysis of CCB-S,
we first formally present an important result in [5], which is relevant in our
setting:
Theorem 5.1 [5]
Let A be a stochastically monotone (resp., ex-post monotone) MAB alloca-
tion rule. There exists a transformation such that the mechanism M obtained
by applying the transformation to the allocation rule A satisfies the following
properties: (a) M is stochastically truthful (resp., ex-post truthful), and ex-post
individually rational. (b) For each success realization, the difference in expected
welfare between A and M is at most γn where 0 < γ < 1 is the parameter
provided to the transformation.
Let ACCB−S be the allocation induced by the CCB-S. Using Theorem 5.1,
we transform it to A˜CCB−S and payment to be PCCB−S . With this we propose
a new mechanism CCB-S, where MCCB−S = {A˜CCB−S ,PCCB−S} for the re-
quester to select a subset of strategic workers with unknown qualities. We now
prove that CCB-S has desirable game theoretic properties.
5.3 Analysis of MCCB−S
As we are using an exploration-seperated allocation rule, one natural way to
ensure truthfulness is to apply the classical VCG mechanism. We cannot ap-
ply the VCG payment scheme in this algorithm as computing VCG payments
requires the computation of an allocation rule in the absence of worker i which
cannot be determined by the algorithm since learning stops after computing the
optimal set.
In order to design an ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individual
rational mechanism, it is enough to design an ex-post monotone allocation rule.
Thus, we will show that our algorithm achieves ex-post monotonicity and hence
we can achieve an ex-post truthful and ex-post individual rational mechanism
(Theorem 5.1).
Theorem 5.2 The allocation rule given by the CCB-S algorithm (ACCB−S) is
ex-post monotone.
Proof: For notation brevity, let us denote ACCB−S by A. In order to prove
monotonicity, we need to prove the following:
Ati(cˆi, c−i; ρ) ≤ Ati(ci, c−i; ρ), ∀i ∈ N , ∀t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, ∀cˆi ≥ ci, ∀ρ .
For a fixed success realization ρ, let us denote Ati(cˆi, c−i; ρ) by Ati(cˆi, c−i) for
notation brevity. Since task t = 1 is given to all the workers irrespective of their
bids, we have A1j (cˆi, c−i) = A1j (ci, c−i) = 1 ∀j ∈ N . Let t be the largest time
step such that, ∀j, At−1j (cˆi, c−i) = At−1j (ci, c−i) = t − 1 (Exploration round
with cˆi and ci). And ∃i such that,
Ati(cˆi, c−i) 6= Ati(ci, c−i) .
Since other costs and quality estimates are the same, this can happen only
when in one case worker i is selected, while in the other case worker i is not
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ALGORITHM 2: CCB-S Algorithm
Input: Set of workers N , number of tasks T , parameter α, confidence
level µ
Output: Labeler selection set St, Label yˆt for all tasks t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}
1 ∀i ∈ N , qˆ+i = 1, qˆ−i = 0.5, ki(1) = 0 // Initialize UCB and LCB on
qualities
2 S1 = N // Select all workers initially
3 Observe y˜(S1) and yˆ1 = AGGREGATE(y˜(S1)) (Definition 4.1)
4 Observe true label y1
5 ∀i ∈ N , ni(1) = 1, ki(1) = 1 if y˜1i = y1 and qˆi = ki(1)/ni(1)
6 t = 2
7 St = arg min
S⊆N
∑
i∈S
ci s.t. fS(qˆ
+) < α
8 while fSt(qˆ
−) > α do
9 // Explore (not the optimal set, select all the workers)
10 St = N
11 Observe judgments of selected labelers y˜(St)
12 yˆt = AGGREGATE(y˜(St))
13 Observe true label yt
14 for i ∈ St do
15 ni(t) = ni(t− 1) + 1
16 if y˜ti = y
t then
17 ki(t) = ki(t− 1) + 1
18 qˆi = ki(t)/ni(t), qˆ
+
i = qˆi +
√
1
2ni(t)
ln( 2nµ ),
qˆ−i = qˆi −
√
1
2ni(t)
ln( 2nµ )
19 t = t+ 1
20 St = arg min
S⊆N
∑
i∈S
ci s.t. fS(qˆ
+) < α
21 t∗ = t
22 St
∗
= St
23 for t = t∗ + 1 to T do
24 // Exploit (optimal set with high probability)
25 St = St
∗
26 Observe judgements of selected labelers y˜(St)
27 yˆt = AGGREGATE(y˜(St))
selected. Let the two sets of workers selected with ci and cˆi be S(ci) and S(cˆi)
respectively. Since the optimization problem involves cost minimization and
quality updates are the same, we have,
Ati(cˆi, c−i) = t− 1 which implies i /∈ S(cˆi),
Ati(ci, c−i) = t which implies i ∈ S(ci) .
Since i /∈ S(cˆi), the selected set S(cˆi) satisfies the lower confidence bound too
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(exploitation round with bid cˆi) and thus for the rest of the tasks, only S(cˆi) is
selected and thus we have, Ati(cˆi, c−i) ≤ Ati(ci, c−i).

We denote the mechanism MCCB−S = (ACCB−S ,PCCB−S). As given by
Theorem 5.1, PCCB−S can be derived by applying the transformation given in
[5]. Thus, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 5.3 The CCB-S algorithm produces an ex-post incentive compatible
and ex-post individual rational mechanism.
One can apply the transformation presented in [5] which takes any ex-post
monotone allocation rule as input and outputs a randomized mechanism which
is ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational.
Regret Analysis
The proposed algorithm is adaptive exploration separated and the number of
exploration steps is determined based on how learning progresses. We will show
that t∗ returned by Step 21 of the algorithm is bounded by 2(h−1(∆))2 ln(
2n
µ ).
In Lemma 5.1, we prove that after l = 2(h−1(∆))2 ln(
2n
µ ) steps, there is no set S
which satisfies the constraint with respect to upper confidence bound and its
cost is less then the optimal cost. Moreover, after l = 2(h−1(∆))2 ln(
2n
µ ) steps, we
have fS∗(qˆ
−) < α with probability 1− µ.
Lemma 5.1 After l = 2(h−1(∆))2 ln(
2n
µ ) number of uniform exploration rounds,
1. for all sets S 6= S∗, fS(q) > α =⇒ fS(qˆ+) > α with probability 1− µ
2. fS∗(qˆ
−) < α with probability 1− µ.
The proof follows from Lemma 4.2 as after l uniform exploration rounds, we
have ni(t) ≥ l, ∀i ∈ N
As a result of Lemmas 4.1 and 5.1, we have the following theorem which
gives us the bound on the number of non-optimal rounds:
Theorem 5.4 The number of non-optimal rounds of the CCB-S algorithm is
bounded by 2(h−1(∆))2 ln(
2n
µ ) with probability 1− µ.
Proof:
• From Lemma 4.1, the CCB-S exploitation rounds are optimal rounds.
• From Lemma 5.1, the number of exploration rounds is bounded by 2(h−1(∆))2 ln(
2n
µ )
with probability 1− µ.
Hence the theorem follows.

Remark (1): The algorithm CCB-S turns out to be an exploration separated al-
gorithm where the number of exploration steps is adaptive unlike the algorithms
presented in [16, 21] and bounds on the number of exploration steps depend on
the parameters ∆ and µ.
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Remark (2): When the value of ∆ is very small compared to T i.e. (h−1(∆))2 <
1
T ln
(
2n
µ
)
, then the algorithm might not converge before T time steps. In a
classical MAB algorithm, for example UCB1, there is an inverse dependence on
∆∗ (difference between sub-optimal arm and optimal arm). If ∆∗ is low, then
UCB1 suffers a large regret. For practical situations, where ∆ is very low, the
requester could provide a range for target accuracy to circumvent high regret.
More details are given in Section 6.3.
We have the following Corollary that follows from Theorem 5.4:
Corollary 5.5 The total expected regret is bounded by(
1− 1
T
)
2
(h−1(∆))2
ln(2nT )C(N ) + L,
where L is the loss incurred by the requester if the constraint is not satisfied.
6 Practical Aspects and Experimental Results
Up until now, our focus was on a combinatorial framework that solves a general
optimization problem. A naive implementation of the CCB-NS algorithm and
the CCB-S algorithm may lead to two problems: 1) computational complexity of
the underlying optimization problem 2) high cost of exploration for the CCB-S
algorithm.
In practice, often the underlying optimization problems are well studied com-
binatorial problems. Due to this, often we may still be able to use the AAB
framework to address the complexity concerns through efficient approximation
algorithms that satisfy monotonicity that we define later. In this section, we
consider the majority rule as the aggregation rule and solve Example 3.2 by for-
mulating it as a minimum knapsack problem. The minimum knapsack problem
is NP-hard, however, there exists polynomial time greedy approximate algo-
rithm that yields a factor of 2 approximation for this problem.
To ensure truthfulness, CCB-S selects all the workers in the exploration steps
and this might result in very high cost when n is large. In general, it is difficult
to eliminate the low quality or high cost workers due to the combinatorial nature
of the problem. However, if there exists a structure to the optimization problem,
it is often possible to eliminate the workers. In the approximate solution of the
minimum knapsack problem, we show that it is possible to early identify and
eliminate the workers of high cost and low quality in CCB-S algorithm. This
elimination avoids high cost of exploration.
6.1 Working with Approximate Solutions
The key to incorporate approximate algorithm in AAB framework is to show its
monotonicity in cost. The CCB-S algorithm that uses the solution returned by
the monotone approximate algorithm gives a monotone allocation rule which is
essential for incentive compatibility.
Definition 6.1 (Monotone Algorithm) An algorithm is said to be mono-
tone if the allocation A returned by the algorithm is monotone in cost i.e. if
two input instances are (c, q) and (c+, q) such that ci < c
+
i , for some i and
cj = c
+
j ∀j 6= i, then Ai(c+, q) = 1⇒ Ai(c, q) = 1.
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Definition 6.2 ((β, γ) Approximate Algorithm) An algorithm is said to be
a (β, γ) approximate algorithm, if for some β ≥ 1 and γ ≤ 1, the solution set S
returned by the algorithm is such that P[C(S) ≤ βC(S∗)] ≥ γ. Here, S∗ is the
solution returned by optimal algorithm.
Proposition 6.1 If there exists a (β, γ) approximation algorithm that is mono-
tone, then, incorporating that (β, γ) approximation scheme in the CCB-S algo-
rithm will result in an ex-post monotone allocation rule.
This is easy to see from Theorem 5.2. Note that, all the workers are selected in
the exploration rounds, and in exploitation rounds, if a worker i is selected with
a certain cost, he will also be selected with a lower cost due to the monotonicity
property of the approximate algorithm.
Remark: The regret notion in the approximation setting is similar to that in
the exact version as the underlying optimization problem with known quality is
also solved using the approximate algorithm.
We now present an example of the minimum knapsack optimization problem
and a greedy solution of the problem. In the greedy solution, it is possible to
eliminate the workers without violating monotonicity condition, thus, avoiding
high cost of exploration. We present the elimination strategy for this example.
6.2 An Illustrative Example with Low Regret
From Example 3.2, if all the workers have qualities of at least 23 , i.e. qi > 2/3
and  = 1/6, then the optimization problem of minimizing cost and satisfying
the accuracy constraint of α can be formulated as follows:
min
S∈N
C(S)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
(2qi − 1) ≥ 6 ln
(
1
α
)
This turns out to be the minimum knapsack problem when ci ≥ 0 and
2qi − 1 ≥ 0 ∀i. Denote ai = 2qi − 1 and M = 6 ln
(
1
α
)
, we have the following
optimization problem:
min
S∈N
C(S) (9)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
ai ≥M
6.2.1 Greedy algorithm (GA)
The minimum knapsack problem has a greedy deterministic algorithm which
gives a (2, 1)−approximate solution [14]. The algorithm denoted by GA is as
follows:
• Arrange the workers in ascending order of their ci/ai ratio. Without
loss of generality, let us assume that the workers are indexed such that
c1
a1
≤ c2a2 ≤ . . . ≤ cnan .
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• Let k1 be the index of the worker such that
∑k1
i ai < M but
∑k1
i ai +
ak1+1 ≥M . Let S0 = {1, 2, . . . , k1}.
• Let k2 be the index of the worker such that
∑k1
i=1 ai + aj ≥M ∀k1 + 1 ≤
j ≤ k2− 1, but
∑k1
i=1 ai + ak2 < M . Let B0 = {k1 + 1, k1 + 2, . . . , k2− 1}.
• Let k3 be the index of the worker such that
∑k1
i ai +
∑k3
k2
ai < M but∑k1
i ai +
∑k3
k2
ai + ak3+1 ≥M . Let S1 = {k2, k2 + 1, . . . , k3}.
• In general let Sl = {k2l, k2l + 1, . . . , k2l+1} and Bl = {k2l+1 + 1, k2l+1 +
2, . . . k2l+2 − 1}, where k0 = 1 and k2l is such that:
∑l
j=0
∑k2j+1
i=k2j
ai < M
but
∑l
j=0
∑k2j+1
i=k2j
ai + am ≥M ∀k2l+1 + 1 ≤ m ≤ k2l+2 − 1.
• Among the sets, Sl ∪ {j} s.t. j ∈ Bl, pick the set which has the minimum
cost and output that as the solution.
Lemma 6.1 [14].
The greedy algorithm GA gives a solution which is (2, 1)−approximate to the
optimal solution i.e.
C(SGA) ≤ 2C(S∗)
where SGA and S∗ are the the solutions returned by the algorithm GA and
optimal algorithm respectively.
Lemma 6.2 The allocation rule given by greedy algorithm is monotone in cost
i.e. if worker i gets a task with cost ci, he also gets a task with cost c
−
i when
the costs and the qualities of the other workers are fixed and c−i < ci.
Proof:
We will prove this case by case. Let worker i be selected with the cost ci.
Call the sets S0, S1, . . . , Sq as small sets and the elements of these sets as small
elements since the constraint is not satisfied with these elements. Similarly, the
sets B0, B1, . . . , Bq are called as big sets and the elements of these sets are called
as big elements. Let the set returned by the algorithm be S0∪S1∪ . . .∪Sq∪{j}
where, j ∈ Bq with cost ci. Now, consider following cases:
1. With cost ci, worker i belongs to set Sl where l ≤ q: Now consider the
following cases when the cost of worker i is decreased from ci to c
−
i :
(a) Worker i remains in Sl but can appear before some other workers in
Sl. In this case, nothing will change as no other worker has changed
positions. Thus, an optimal solution will still be S0∪S1∪. . .∪Sq∪{j}
since cost has only reduced and worker i will get selected.
(b) Worker i moves to some Sm with m ≤ l. Since i was already in the
small set, Sm will remain small. Moreover, all the other workers from
small sets till Sq remains small. Thus, the optimal solution will not
change and i will get selected.
(c) Note that the worker i can never become a big element by reducing
cost.
2. With cost ci, worker j = i. Thus, i is a big element with cost ci. Again,
consider the following cases when worker i changes his bid to c−i :
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(a) Worker i becomes big element such that i ∈ Bm with m ≤ q. The
optimal set will be S0 ∪ S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sm ∪ {i} and hence i remains in
the solution.
(b) Worker i becomes small such that i ∈ Sm with m ≤ q. Since i was
big till set Sq, some worker k from some small set Sl with l ≤ q will
become big. Then, the optimal set will be S0 ∪ S1 ∪ . . . Sl ∪ {k} will
become optimal and hence i will be selected.
6.2.2 Elimination Strategy with Greedy Algorithm GA
Let us suppose we have (with suitable relabelling)
c1
aˆ−1
≤ c2
aˆ−2
≤ . . . ≤ ck
aˆ−k
, (10)
where, aˆ−i = 2qˆ
−
i − 1. Let the set {1, . . . , k} be such that a set S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k}
is selected by GA, and thus, they meet the accuracy constraint with their lower
confidence bounds. Further, let us suppose there exists an agent r ∈ {k +
1, . . . , n} such that ck
aˆ−k
≤ cr
aˆ+r
and cr ≥ ci,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then agent r can be
discarded “safely”. By safely, we mean that with qualities known perfectly, GA
algorithm has a candidate solution of cost less than or equal to any candidate
solution containing r with probability (1− µ).
Proof:
In the run of GA algorithm with true qualities, the elements 1, . . . , k precedes
r due to ck
aˆ−k
≤ cr
aˆ+r
with probability (1− µ).
As {1, . . . , k}meets the accuracy constraint with LCB, they meet it with true
qualities also (with high probability). Therefore, there exists a p ∈ {1, . . . , k},
which belongs to a big set in the run of GA with true qualities. Any candidate
set with p in the run will be of the form ∪qi=1Si ∪ {p}. Any candidate set with
r will be of the form ∪li=1Si ∪ {r} with l ≥ q. Therefore, in the run of GA, we
can ignore any candidate solutions with r and hence r can be dropped safely.
This is because C(∪qi=1Si ∪ {p}) ≤ C(∪lj=1Sj ∪ {r}) as ∪qi=1Si ⊆ ∪lj=1Sj and
cp ≤ cr.
Lemma 6.3 Algorithm GA with elimination strategy described above produces
monotone allocation rule in terms of cost.
Proof:
Note that in the exploration phase, if the worker i reduces his cost, he can be
eliminated at a later stage only and thus the number of allocations in the ex-
ploration phase increases. In exploitation phase, the monotonicity is immediate
from Lemma 6.2.
We call the algorithm GA with elimination strategy as CCB-SE (constrained
confidence bound algorithm with strategic elimination). Due to the above
Lemma, CCB-SE algorithm can be transformed into incentive compatible mech-
anism.
6.3 Simulation Results
In this section, we compare the efficacy of the proposed algorithms via sim-
ulations. For simulations, we use the minimum knapsack problem described
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in the previous section which is solved using the greedy algorithm GA. We
compare the regret of four algorithms namely, CCB-NS, CCB-S, CCB-SE and
a variant of the εt−greedy algorithm. The εt−greedy algorithm [3] solves the
classical multi-armed bandit problem which involves the selection of the single
best arm. In the classical version, a random arm is explored with probability εt
and the optimal arm (with the highest empirical mean) is selected with proba-
bility 1− εt. We extend the algorithm to the AAB setting by exploring all the
workers with probability εt and with probability (1−εt), we select the minimum
cost worker subset which meets the target constraint with the empirically esti-
mated qualities. The parameter εt = min{1, 100t } decreases with time so as to
give more weight to exploitation than exploration. Note that, the εt algorithm
is not strategyproof.
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Figure 2: Average regret vs task number. Curves show averages over 1000
samples. Note that CCB-NS and εt−greedy algorithms are not ex-post incentive
compatible whereas CCB-S and CCB-SE are.
In the simulations, we have selected the number of agents to be 1100. To
emphasize the fact that CCB-SE algorithm identifies bad workers early, out
of the 1100 workers, 600 workers are chosen with cost as 20 and quality as
2/3 whereas, the other 500 workers are chosen with the costs uniformly drawn
between 10 and 20 and the quality uniformly drawn between 2/3 and 1. The
required target accuracy is chosen to be 0.9 with α = 0.1. Since the value of ∆
can be arbitrarily low, we adopt the following strategy for the implementation.
We solve the optimization problem with UCB for a target accuracy of 0.95 but
check the lower confidence bound with target accuracy 0.9. This ensures that the
constraint is never violated, however, it may result in extra cost of workers for
the rest of the rounds. Since the costs of the workers are not adversarially chosen,
the expected difference between the optimal set with accuracy 0.9 and 0.95 is not
large. In general, if the requester gives a target accuracy range of (1−α, 1−α+ξ)
such that the upper confidence bound is solved using accuracy 1 − α + ξ but
the lower bound is checked with accuracy 1 − α, then it is possible to control
the number of non-optimal rounds and it can be shown that the number of
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Figure 3: Total cost vs task number. Curves show averages over 1000 sam-
ples. Note that CCB-NS and εt−greedy algorithms are not ex-post incentive
compatible whereas CCB-S and CCB-SE are.
600 700 800 900 1,000 1,100 1,200 1,300 1,400 1,500
0
2
4
6
8
·107
Number of workers
T
ot
al
C
os
t
CCB-NS
CCB-SE
CCB-S
εt−greedy
Figure 4: Total cost with number of workers
non-optimal rounds is at most min
(
1
16(h−1(ξ))2 ln
(
2n
µ
)
, 2(h−1(∆))2 ln
(
2n
µ
))
. In
the εt−greedy algorithm, the worker set is chosen such that the target accuracy
of 0.9 is achieved with respect to the estimated qualities. For simulations, we
have chosen T to be 104. However, if T is large, one can choose a smaller
value of ξ. Over 1200 runs of simulations, we observed that none of the four
algorithms violated the stochastic constraint with respect to the true qualities.
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With ξ = 0.05, the comparison of the average regret and the negative social
welfare is given in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. The regret is compared against
the greedy solution returned by GA algorithm with true qualities. We ran 1000
samples to generate the graphs. We see that the algorithm CCB-NS converges
much faster when compared to the εt−greedy algorithm. We also see that the
cost of CCB-SE algorithm reduces significantly in a few iterations only. We also
compare the total cost between CCB-NS algorithm and εt−greedy algorithm
with change in the number of workers (Figure 4). The simulations show that
the CCB-NS algorithm outperforms the εt−greedy algorithm even when there
are fewer number of workers.
7 Summary and Future Work
Motivated by the need for a mechanism where the worker qualities are not known
a priori and their costs are private information, we considered the problem of
selecting an optimal subset of the workers so that the outcome obtained from
aggregating labels from the selected workers attains a target accuracy level. We
proposed a novel framework, Assured Accuracy Bandit (AAB) in this setting
and developed an algorithm, Strategic Constrained Confidence Bound (CCB-S)
for the same, which also leads to an ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post
individually rational mechanism. We have provided bounds on the number
of exploration steps that depends on the target accuracy level and the true
qualities.
Often, the optimization problem to be solved for each task inherently has
exponential time complexity. In most cases, there exist efficient approximate
algorithms for solving the optimization problem. If these algorithms are mono-
tone, then the algorithms can be combined with CCB-S algorithm to provide a
truthful, IR mechanism.
An interesting line of future research could be to improve the convergence
rate of CCB-S. The slow convergence of CCB-S can be attributed to the algo-
rithm being exploration separated. If there exists a structure to the algorithm
for solving the combinatorial optimization problem, then some strategy for elim-
inating workers in the strategic setting can be adapted. We have seen a strategy
in one example. A generalization of this to all possible optimization problem
may require more assumption on the function fS(q) and forms an interesting
future direction. Working with soft constraint formulation of this problem forms
another extension for the future.
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